Here is a review written by IFALPA after they looked at the stuff that’s so far come out of the QF A380 incident. All fairly straightforward, and once again, it highlights what a great job the highly experienced and well trained QF crew did.
It also poses some really troubling questions that have the potential to shake up the entire system from certification authorities through regulators, through airline training departments. It also blows away the Airbus mantra that their jets are so smart that you can stuff an inexperienced crew from Nigeria in the cockpit, and as long as they can keep the wings level until the A/P is turned on, and then slavishly follow what the totally brilliant and foolproof ECAM system tells them is wrong and what to do in what order, all will be well… Continue reading “More on the Qantas A380 Emergency”
massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks, including in the horizontal stabiliser on the tail)
massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank
a hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body through
the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer functions
fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above
bloody great hole in the upper wing surface
partial failure of leading edge slats
partial failure of speed brakes/ground spoilers
shrapnel damage to the flaps
total loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (beast has 2 x 5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)
manual extension of landing gear
loss of 1 generator and associated systems
loss of brake anti-skid system
unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing due to major damage to systems
unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using the fire switch!
therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the explosion in #2
ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left side, that were unable to be fixed with cross-feeding
fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail)
therefore, possible major C of G out-of-balance condition for landing.
The Captain was in the left seat, FO in the right), SO in the 2nd obs seat (right rear, also with his own Radio Management Panel, so he probably did most of the coordination with the ground), Check & Training Captain in the 1st obs seat (middle), training another C & T Captain. All five guys were flat out, especially the FO who would have been processing complicated ‘ECAM’ messages and procedures that were seemingly never-ending.